POST /api/tables/... only reads, so read-only keys may use it (and the
API docs list it for them). Keys limited to some addresses can't open
the WebSocket, whose address isn't checked, nor keys whose allowed
paths leave out /ws. Refusals are audited without an account target.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bearer keys (dlk_...) are checked per request against their owner's
current account (ban, lock, demotion, sign out everywhere stop or narrow
them at once) and their scope: permission routes need the permission in
scope, read-only keys only read, level-only routes need an all-permission
key, and session-only paths (sign-in, password, 2FA, key management)
are never reachable with a key. Per-key rate limit and daily quota with
429 and X-RateLimit/X-Quota/Retry-After headers; usage is written in
batches every minute. WebSocket subscriptions honour the scope too.
Routes to list, make, rotate and revoke keys; staff with
api_keys_manage can see and revoke others' keys under the rank rules.
POST /api/auth/token now makes an all-permission key. Audit entries for
create/rotate/revoke/denied, and actions done with a key are attributed
to "user (key name)".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
