Files
yattee/Yattee/Services/Credentials/CredentialIdentityScope.swift
Arkadiusz Fal c4053d5100 Close identity and adoption holes in credential scoping
Four issues from an external review of the previous commit.

The scope was resolved once at startup, so signing out or switching Apple
account while the app kept running left it pinned to the old identity -
reads and writes would then reach the previous account's retained
credentials, which is the exact leak scoping exists to prevent.
CredentialIdentityScope now observes NSUbiquityIdentityDidChange and
re-resolves.

Legacy deletion authority checked only the instance and the identity, not
the account. On an instance with several accounts, deleting any of them
satisfied the marker lookup and could retire the legacy item another
account had adopted, logging out devices still on the previous release.
The marker's accountID is now required to match.

A first-time resolution that failed (launched offline, CloudKit
unreachable) was never retried, disabling credentials for the rest of the
process. resolve() now retries with backoff, and resolveIfNeeded() runs on
foreground activation.

Adoption re-checked nothing at execution time, so a scoped credential
delivered by iCloud Keychain between rendering the offer and tapping it
would be overwritten with the older legacy secret. Adoption now re-verifies
eligibility and writes with a non-replacing add, leaving a duplicate
strictly alone.

Adds regression tests for the sibling-account deletion and the adoption
race.
2026-08-23 23:39:06 +02:00

246 lines
9.5 KiB
Swift

//
// CredentialIdentityScope.swift
// Yattee
//
// Resolves the Apple-account scope that Keychain credentials are keyed by.
//
import Foundation
/// Resolves the identity scope that account credentials are namespaced under.
///
/// ### Why credentials are scoped at all
///
/// Apple documents that Keychain data may remain on device when a user signs
/// out of their Apple account and chooses to keep it, and Yattee's credential
/// managers query `kSecAttrSynchronizableAny`. An unscoped key would therefore
/// hand a credential retained from Apple account A to whoever signs in next —
/// and for migrated accounts that collision is *guaranteed*, because local
/// instances survive an Apple-account switch and the migrated account UUID is
/// deterministically the instance UUID.
///
/// Measured on iPadOS 27.0: a synchronizable item retained across a sign-out
/// keeps `kSecAttrSynchronizable = true` and still matches a strict
/// `== true` query with **no** Apple account signed in — so the attribute
/// cannot be used to tell "belongs to the current account" from "left over
/// from the previous one". Scoping the key is the only reliable defence, and
/// legacy items are never adopted automatically (see
/// ``AccountKeychainCredentials/adoptLegacyCredential(for:)``).
///
/// ### Why the CloudKit user record, not the ubiquity token
///
/// The scope has to be identical on every device signed in to the same Apple
/// account, or iCloud Keychain sync would stop working — each device would
/// write under a different key. `FileManager.ubiquityIdentityToken` carries no
/// such cross-device guarantee, so the CloudKit user record ID is the scope
/// value; the ubiquity token is used only as a synchronous, offline-capable
/// signal that the account *changed*.
@MainActor
@Observable
final class CredentialIdentityScope {
/// Scope used when no Apple account is available — signed out, or a
/// sideloaded build with no iCloud entitlement.
static let localScope = CloudKitIdentity.localScope
enum State: Equatable {
/// Signed in, but the CloudKit user record hasn't been fetched yet.
/// Credential access is refused in this state: writing under a guessed
/// scope is exactly the mistake scoping exists to prevent.
case unresolved
case resolved(String)
}
private(set) var state: State = .unresolved
/// Fingerprint of the Apple account the current state belongs to.
/// A change here means the scope must be re-resolved.
private(set) var fingerprint: String?
private let defaults: UserDefaults
private let resolveUserRecordID: @Sendable () async -> String?
/// Written only on the main actor; read in `deinit`, which runs after the
/// last reference is gone and so cannot race with it.
private nonisolated(unsafe) var identityChangeObserver: NSObjectProtocol?
private static let cacheKey = "credentialIdentityScopeCache"
/// Attempts made for the Apple account currently being resolved. Reset
/// whenever the identity changes.
private var resolutionAttempts = 0
private var isResolving = false
private static let maxResolutionAttempts = 4
/// The resolved scope, or `nil` while unresolved.
var current: String? {
if case let .resolved(scope) = state { return scope }
return nil
}
var isResolved: Bool { current != nil }
init(
defaults: UserDefaults = .standard,
resolveUserRecordID: @escaping @Sendable () async -> String? = { await CloudKitIdentity.userRecordID() }
) {
self.defaults = defaults
self.resolveUserRecordID = resolveUserRecordID
adoptCurrentIdentity()
observeIdentityChanges()
}
deinit {
if let identityChangeObserver {
NotificationCenter.default.removeObserver(identityChangeObserver)
}
}
/// Re-scopes as soon as the Apple account changes under a running app.
///
/// Without this the scope would stay pinned to whichever account was
/// signed in at launch, and a sign-out or switch mid-session would let
/// reads and writes reach the previous account's retained credentials —
/// the exact leak scoping exists to prevent.
private func observeIdentityChanges() {
identityChangeObserver = NotificationCenter.default.addObserver(
forName: .NSUbiquityIdentityDidChange,
object: nil,
queue: .main
) { [weak self] _ in
MainActor.assumeIsolated {
guard let self else { return }
LoggingService.shared.info(
"Apple account changed — re-resolving the credential identity scope",
category: .keychain
)
self.adoptCurrentIdentity()
Task { await self.resolve() }
}
}
}
/// Test seam: a scope pinned up front, never consulting CloudKit.
/// `nil` pins the unresolved state.
init(fixedScope: String?, defaults: UserDefaults = .standard) {
self.defaults = defaults
resolveUserRecordID = { nil }
fingerprint = nil
state = fixedScope.map { State.resolved($0) } ?? .unresolved
}
// MARK: - Resolution
/// Re-reads the Apple account and restores the cached scope if there is
/// one. Synchronous and offline-capable, so it is safe at launch.
///
/// Call again on `.accountChange`: a switch that happened while the app was
/// closed shows up here, before any CloudKit request could report it.
func adoptCurrentIdentity() {
let current = CloudKitIdentity.ubiquityFingerprint
if current != fingerprint {
resolutionAttempts = 0
}
fingerprint = current
guard CloudKitAvailability.isAvailable else {
// No iCloud entitlement: nothing can sync, and there is no ambient
// identity for a retained credential to leak to.
state = .resolved(Self.localScope)
return
}
guard let current else {
// Signed out. Local scope is correct *and* isolating: items written
// here never collide with a signed-in account's keys.
state = .resolved(Self.localScope)
return
}
if let cached = cachedScope(for: current) {
state = .resolved(cached)
} else {
state = .unresolved
}
}
/// Fetches the CloudKit user record and caches it against the current
/// Apple account, so every later launch resolves synchronously.
///
/// Only the first resolution for a given Apple account needs the network.
/// While it is outstanding, credential access reports "can't tell yet"
/// rather than "not signed in" — callers must not treat that as a missing
/// credential.
func resolve() async {
guard !isResolved, !isResolving else { return }
isResolving = true
defer { isResolving = false }
// Captured before the first await so a switch mid-flight can be
// detected: a record ID fetched under account A must never be cached
// for B.
let requested = fingerprint
while resolutionAttempts < Self.maxResolutionAttempts {
resolutionAttempts += 1
if let recordID = await resolveUserRecordID() {
guard CloudKitIdentity.ubiquityFingerprint == requested, fingerprint == requested else {
LoggingService.shared.info(
"Discarding credential scope resolved for a previous Apple account",
category: .keychain
)
return
}
if let requested {
cache(recordID, for: requested)
}
state = .resolved(recordID)
LoggingService.shared.info(
"Resolved credential identity scope",
category: .keychain,
details: "fingerprint=\(requested ?? "none"), attempt=\(resolutionAttempts)"
)
return
}
guard resolutionAttempts < Self.maxResolutionAttempts else { break }
try? await Task.sleep(for: .seconds(pow(2.0, Double(resolutionAttempts))))
guard fingerprint == requested else { return }
}
// Every credential read is disabled until this succeeds, so failing
// quietly would look exactly like "signed out". Foreground activation
// retries via resolveIfNeeded().
LoggingService.shared.warning(
"Could not resolve the credential identity scope — credentials stay unavailable until it does",
category: .keychain
)
}
/// Retries a resolution that previously ran out of attempts.
///
/// Called when the app returns to the foreground: a device that launched
/// offline would otherwise keep credentials unavailable for the entire
/// process lifetime, long after connectivity returned.
func resolveIfNeeded() async {
guard !isResolved else { return }
resolutionAttempts = 0
await resolve()
}
// MARK: - Cache
private func cachedScope(for fingerprint: String) -> String? {
(defaults.dictionary(forKey: Self.cacheKey) as? [String: String])?[fingerprint]
}
private func cache(_ scope: String, for fingerprint: String) {
var cache = (defaults.dictionary(forKey: Self.cacheKey) as? [String: String]) ?? [:]
cache[fingerprint] = scope
defaults.set(cache, forKey: Self.cacheKey)
}
}