mirror of
https://github.com/yattee/yattee.git
synced 2026-10-24 05:32:53 +00:00
Local data is always a valid context. The legacy validator predates that: it treats local as unavailable without a Yattee Server, which is a feed concern the feed reports itself — and since the correction now moves the data context with it, that would have quietly put users on somebody's backend account, overwriting a local choice made on another device. Stale feed responses no longer touch anything. Rejecting only the videos still let a request from a login the cache had moved off overwrite the new one's loading state, error state and pagination — replacement requests are allowed to overlap, so both were in flight. The unreachable retry timers are cancelled when the namespace reloads. A migrated account reuses its instance's UUID, so the same ID can exist under the next Apple account, and an old timer would declare that account reachable on the strength of a verdict about someone else's. Rewriting a credential's sync flag is skipped when it already matches and restores the original if the re-add fails. Changing that flag means delete-then-add, and the delete propagates to every device — turning sync on should never be able to log the user out.
384 lines
15 KiB
Swift
384 lines
15 KiB
Swift
//
|
|
// AccountKeychainCredentials.swift
|
|
// Yattee
|
|
//
|
|
// Shared implementation of account-keyed, identity-scoped credential storage.
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
import Foundation
|
|
|
|
/// The engine behind `AccountCredentialsManager`.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Both credential managers own one of these and forward to it, so the scoping
|
|
/// rules and the legacy-adoption protocol exist in exactly one place.
|
|
@MainActor
|
|
@Observable
|
|
final class AccountKeychainCredentials {
|
|
private let store: KeychainCredentialStore
|
|
private let identityScope: CredentialIdentityScope
|
|
private let markers: CredentialAdoptionMarkerStore
|
|
|
|
/// Name used in log lines ("SID", "token") so messages read naturally for
|
|
/// whichever backend owns this instance.
|
|
private let credentialNoun: String
|
|
|
|
/// Known logins, partitioned by the identity scope they were observed under.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Keyed rather than invalidated: a switch of Apple account (or the first
|
|
/// resolution completing) must never let one identity's cache answer for
|
|
/// another, and clearing a shared cache would mean mutating observable
|
|
/// state from inside read methods a view body can call.
|
|
private var loginsByScope: [String: Set<UUID>] = [:]
|
|
|
|
/// Accounts holding a credential under the current identity.
|
|
var loggedInAccountIDs: Set<UUID> {
|
|
guard let scope = identityScope.current else { return [] }
|
|
return loginsByScope[scope] ?? []
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
weak var settingsManager: SettingsManager?
|
|
|
|
init(
|
|
service: String,
|
|
credentialNoun: String,
|
|
identityScope: CredentialIdentityScope,
|
|
markers: CredentialAdoptionMarkerStore? = nil
|
|
) {
|
|
store = KeychainCredentialStore(service: service)
|
|
self.credentialNoun = credentialNoun
|
|
self.identityScope = identityScope
|
|
self.markers = markers ?? CredentialAdoptionMarkerStore()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var isScopeResolved: Bool { identityScope.isResolved }
|
|
|
|
/// Credentials sync to iCloud Keychain on the same toggle as the instances
|
|
/// they belong to.
|
|
private var shouldSyncToiCloud: Bool {
|
|
settingsManager?.iCloudSyncEnabled == true && settingsManager?.syncInstances == true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func currentScope() -> String? {
|
|
identityScope.current
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MARK: - Credentials
|
|
|
|
func setCredential(_ credential: String, for account: Account) {
|
|
guard let scope = currentScope() else {
|
|
LoggingService.shared.error(
|
|
"Refusing to store \(credentialNoun) before the identity scope is resolved",
|
|
category: .keychain,
|
|
details: "accountID=\(account.id)"
|
|
)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let syncEnabled = shouldSyncToiCloud
|
|
let status = store.set(
|
|
credential,
|
|
forKey: KeychainCredentialStore.credentialKey(scope: scope, accountID: account.id),
|
|
synchronizable: syncEnabled
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
guard status == errSecSuccess else {
|
|
LoggingService.shared.error(
|
|
"Failed to store \(credentialNoun)",
|
|
category: .keychain,
|
|
details: "accountID=\(account.id), status=\(store.describe(status))"
|
|
)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
loginsByScope[scope, default: []].insert(account.id)
|
|
|
|
LoggingService.shared.info(
|
|
"Stored \(credentialNoun)",
|
|
category: .keychain,
|
|
details: "accountID=\(account.id), iCloudSync=\(syncEnabled)"
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func credential(for account: Account) -> String? {
|
|
guard let scope = currentScope() else { return nil }
|
|
return store.value(
|
|
forKey: KeychainCredentialStore.credentialKey(scope: scope, accountID: account.id)
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func deleteCredential(for account: Account) {
|
|
deleteCredential(forAccountID: account.id)
|
|
HomeInstanceCache.shared.clear(instanceID: account.instanceID, contentType: .feed)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Rewrites the stored credentials so they carry the current sync setting.
|
|
///
|
|
/// `kSecAttrSynchronizable` is fixed when an item is written, so a login
|
|
/// stored while iCloud sync was off stays local forever. Enabling sync
|
|
/// afterwards uploads the account metadata, and every other device would
|
|
/// then show an account whose credential never arrives. Called when the
|
|
/// user turns sync on.
|
|
func resyncCredentialsWithCurrentSetting() {
|
|
guard let scope = identityScope.current else { return }
|
|
|
|
let syncEnabled = shouldSyncToiCloud
|
|
|
|
for accountID in loginsByScope[scope] ?? [] {
|
|
rewrite(
|
|
key: KeychainCredentialStore.credentialKey(scope: scope, accountID: accountID),
|
|
synchronizable: syncEnabled
|
|
)
|
|
rewrite(
|
|
key: KeychainCredentialStore.usernameKey(scope: scope, accountID: accountID),
|
|
synchronizable: syncEnabled
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Rewrites one item so it carries the wanted sync flag.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Skipped when the flag already matches: the only way to change it is to
|
|
/// delete and re-add, which risks the login for no reason — and deleting a
|
|
/// synchronizable item propagates to every device. If the re-add does fail,
|
|
/// the original is put back the way it was rather than left missing.
|
|
private func rewrite(key: String, synchronizable: Bool) {
|
|
guard let value = store.value(forKey: key) else { return }
|
|
|
|
let current = store.isSynchronizable(key: key)
|
|
guard current != synchronizable else { return }
|
|
|
|
let status = store.set(value, forKey: key, synchronizable: synchronizable)
|
|
guard status != errSecSuccess else { return }
|
|
|
|
let restored = store.set(value, forKey: key, synchronizable: current ?? false)
|
|
LoggingService.shared.error(
|
|
restored == errSecSuccess
|
|
? "Could not change how a \(credentialNoun) syncs — left it as it was"
|
|
: "Could not change how a \(credentialNoun) syncs, and could not restore it",
|
|
category: .keychain,
|
|
details: "status=\(store.describe(status))"
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func deleteCredential(forAccountID accountID: UUID) {
|
|
guard let scope = currentScope() else { return }
|
|
|
|
store.delete(key: KeychainCredentialStore.credentialKey(scope: scope, accountID: accountID))
|
|
store.delete(key: KeychainCredentialStore.usernameKey(scope: scope, accountID: accountID))
|
|
loginsByScope[scope]?.remove(accountID)
|
|
|
|
LoggingService.shared.info(
|
|
"Deleted \(credentialNoun)",
|
|
category: .keychain,
|
|
details: "accountID=\(accountID)"
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MARK: - Username
|
|
|
|
func setUsername(_ username: String, for account: Account) {
|
|
guard let scope = currentScope() else { return }
|
|
store.set(
|
|
username,
|
|
forKey: KeychainCredentialStore.usernameKey(scope: scope, accountID: account.id),
|
|
synchronizable: shouldSyncToiCloud
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func username(for account: Account) -> String? {
|
|
guard let scope = currentScope() else { return nil }
|
|
return store.value(
|
|
forKey: KeychainCredentialStore.usernameKey(scope: scope, accountID: account.id)
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MARK: - Status
|
|
|
|
func isLoggedIn(for account: Account) -> Bool {
|
|
guard let scope = currentScope() else { return false }
|
|
|
|
if loginsByScope[scope]?.contains(account.id) == true {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let hasCredential = credential(for: account) != nil
|
|
if hasCredential {
|
|
loginsByScope[scope, default: []].insert(account.id)
|
|
}
|
|
return hasCredential
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func refreshLoginStatus(for account: Account) {
|
|
guard let scope = currentScope() else { return }
|
|
|
|
if credential(for: account) != nil {
|
|
loginsByScope[scope, default: []].insert(account.id)
|
|
} else {
|
|
loginsByScope[scope]?.remove(account.id)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MARK: - Legacy adoption
|
|
|
|
func hasAdoptableLegacyCredential(for account: Account) -> Bool {
|
|
guard let scope = currentScope() else { return false }
|
|
guard !markers.hasAdopted(service: store.service, instanceID: account.instanceID, scope: scope) else { return false }
|
|
guard credential(for: account) == nil else { return false }
|
|
|
|
return legacyCredential(for: account) != nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Copies the legacy item into this account's scoped key.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Copies — never moves. Deleting a synchronizable item propagates to every
|
|
/// device signed in to the same Apple account, so removing the legacy item
|
|
/// here would log the user out of devices still running the previous
|
|
/// release, mid-rollout. It is retained until the account is really
|
|
/// deleted; general cleanup waits for a compatibility-breaking release.
|
|
@discardableResult
|
|
func adoptLegacyCredential(for account: Account) -> Bool {
|
|
guard let scope = currentScope() else { return false }
|
|
guard !markers.hasAdopted(service: store.service, instanceID: account.instanceID, scope: scope) else { return false }
|
|
guard let legacy = legacyCredential(for: account) else { return false }
|
|
|
|
// Eligibility is re-checked here, not just when the offer was rendered:
|
|
// iCloud Keychain may have delivered the real credential in between, and
|
|
// replacing it with the older legacy secret would be a silent downgrade.
|
|
guard credential(for: account) == nil else {
|
|
LoggingService.shared.info(
|
|
"Skipping legacy \(credentialNoun) adoption — a scoped credential already arrived",
|
|
category: .keychain,
|
|
details: "accountID=\(account.id)"
|
|
)
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let key = KeychainCredentialStore.credentialKey(scope: scope, accountID: account.id)
|
|
let status = store.addIfAbsent(legacy, forKey: key, synchronizable: shouldSyncToiCloud)
|
|
|
|
// A duplicate means a scoped credential landed between the check above
|
|
// and this write — leave it strictly alone, it is newer than the legacy
|
|
// secret.
|
|
guard status == errSecSuccess else {
|
|
LoggingService.shared.error(
|
|
"Legacy \(credentialNoun) adoption did not write",
|
|
category: .keychain,
|
|
details: "accountID=\(account.id), status=\(store.describe(status))"
|
|
)
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The marker is only written after the scoped copy reads back: a marker
|
|
// for a credential that never landed would suppress the adoption offer
|
|
// and strand the user with no way to sign in short of retyping.
|
|
let readback = store.value(forKey: key)
|
|
|
|
guard readback == legacy else {
|
|
// A *different* readable value means iCloud Keychain delivered a
|
|
// credential for this key between the add and the read. It is newer
|
|
// than the legacy secret and belongs to a live login, so it is left
|
|
// strictly alone — deleting here would propagate through iCloud
|
|
// Keychain and revoke it on every device.
|
|
if readback != nil {
|
|
LoggingService.shared.info(
|
|
"Legacy \(credentialNoun) adoption superseded by a credential that arrived mid-write",
|
|
category: .keychain,
|
|
details: "accountID=\(account.id)"
|
|
)
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Nothing readable is there. Tempting to roll the write back, but a
|
|
// delete cannot be conditioned on the value that was just read:
|
|
// `SecItemDelete` ignores `kSecValueData` (measured — a delete
|
|
// issued with a deliberately wrong value still removes the item),
|
|
// so the rollback would be a blind delete of whatever occupies the
|
|
// key by then, including a credential that arrived from another
|
|
// device in the gap — and it would propagate. Nothing is deleted;
|
|
// no marker is written, so the account simply stays signed out and
|
|
// an ordinary sign-in (a replacing write) recovers it.
|
|
LoggingService.shared.error(
|
|
"Legacy \(credentialNoun) adoption failed verification — sign-in required",
|
|
category: .keychain,
|
|
details: "accountID=\(account.id)"
|
|
)
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
markers.record(
|
|
service: store.service,
|
|
instanceID: account.instanceID,
|
|
accountID: account.id,
|
|
scope: scope,
|
|
secret: legacy
|
|
)
|
|
loginsByScope[scope, default: []].insert(account.id)
|
|
|
|
LoggingService.shared.info(
|
|
"Adopted legacy \(credentialNoun) into the identity-scoped key",
|
|
category: .keychain,
|
|
details: "accountID=\(account.id), instanceID=\(account.instanceID)"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func deleteLegacyCredentialIfOwned(for account: Account) {
|
|
guard let scope = currentScope() else { return }
|
|
|
|
let legacyKey = KeychainCredentialStore.legacyKey(instanceID: account.instanceID)
|
|
let currentValue = store.value(forKey: legacyKey)
|
|
|
|
guard markers.canDeleteLegacyItem(
|
|
service: store.service,
|
|
instanceID: account.instanceID,
|
|
accountID: account.id,
|
|
scope: scope,
|
|
currentLegacyValue: currentValue
|
|
) else {
|
|
LoggingService.shared.info(
|
|
"Leaving the legacy \(credentialNoun) in place — not this account's to delete",
|
|
category: .keychain,
|
|
details: "instanceID=\(account.instanceID), accountID=\(account.id)"
|
|
)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Re-read immediately before deleting. The Keychain offers no
|
|
// compare-and-delete — `SecItemDelete` ignores `kSecValueData`
|
|
// (measured) — so the fingerprint check above can only ever validate a
|
|
// snapshot. Re-reading here shrinks the window to a single call gap and
|
|
// catches a replacement that landed while the fingerprint was being
|
|
// computed.
|
|
//
|
|
// A residual race remains by construction: if another device running
|
|
// the previous release writes a new legacy value inside that gap, this
|
|
// deletes their fresh login and the deletion propagates. Accepted —
|
|
// closing it is not possible with these APIs, and the alternative
|
|
// (never deleting) leaves a credential the user explicitly removed
|
|
// sitting in their iCloud Keychain indefinitely.
|
|
guard store.value(forKey: legacyKey) == currentValue else {
|
|
LoggingService.shared.info(
|
|
"Legacy \(credentialNoun) changed while being retired — leaving it in place",
|
|
category: .keychain,
|
|
details: "instanceID=\(account.instanceID)"
|
|
)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
store.delete(key: legacyKey)
|
|
markers.removeMarker(service: store.service, instanceID: account.instanceID, scope: scope)
|
|
|
|
LoggingService.shared.info(
|
|
"Deleted the legacy \(credentialNoun) alongside its account",
|
|
category: .keychain,
|
|
details: "instanceID=\(account.instanceID)"
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Reads the unscoped, pre-revamp item. Only the adoption paths call this.
|
|
private func legacyCredential(for account: Account) -> String? {
|
|
store.value(forKey: KeychainCredentialStore.legacyKey(instanceID: account.instanceID))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|